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In his brief but penetrating discussion of defeasibility, Johnson develops four main 
lines of criticisms towards Pollock's account of this notion. He argues that: 
 
 the notion of information, as used by Pollock, would require clarification; 
 there has been too much loose talk in the secondary literature on 
defeasibility, with “defeasible” being equated with or associated to 
“revisable”, “falsifiable”, “criticizable”, and more; 
 the defeasibility frame is too adversarial, tending to describe argumentation 
as a competition; 
 Pollock's inventory of defeaters is guilty of premise blindness, a flaw he 
inherits from “the deductivist proclivities of formal logic”. 
 
On the first two criticisms, I can only agree with Johnson: indeed, the notion of 
information is extremely problematic, and Pollock's treatment of it was sketchy at 
best; and yes, the amount of loose talk on defeasibility in the literature is hard to 
stomach and in dire need of regimentation. 
 As for the accusation of excessive militarization of argumentative exchanges, 
again I am happy to concede Johnson’s point, although I would add two 
considerations. First, argumentation theories should strive to remain neutral, as 
much as possible, on the competition / cooperation axis, when it comes to the 
analysis of arguments: to my mind, a theoretical account that systematically 
marginalizes the adversarial aspects of argumentation is as biased as one that gives 
them too much emphasis. Second, quite often a non-adversarial theoretical 
framework is obtained by solving ex ante one or more significant tensions between 
opposite priorities. Johnson himself offers a good example of this, when he describes 
his approach as one where “the purpose of argumentation would be to arrive at the 
best outcome; and we agree that the way to achieve this is through the giving and 
processing and criticizing and evaluation of reasons” (p. 10). No matter how much 
one agrees with this view, it is easy to notice that some potentially relevant factors 
here have been removed from the scope of consideration: for instance, the 
rhetorical values of different arguments, or the idea that each person is entitled to 
argue to foster private goals, whether or not these converge on any shared “best 
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outcome”. This is how peace looks after a (meta-theoretical) war has been fought 
and won, regarding the purpose and practice of argumentation. 
 However, these are just cursory remarks that basically underscore my 
agreement with Johnson’s views, with some qualification. Instead, I am a bit more 
sceptical on his accusation of premise blindness, and on the way in which he arrives 
to formulate such charge against Pollock. Thus, I will devote the remainder of my 
commentary to this issue. 
 Let me start by saying that the famous “Tweety example” is indeed a very 
poor one, and thus offers an easy target for Johnson’s well aimed criticism. It 
wouldn't be fair to claim that Johnson is straw-manning Pollock, but only because it 
was Pollock himself that was straw-manning his own cause, by providing such a 
poor example of defeasible reasoning as a case study. 
 Here is the original argument: 
 
(1) Tweety is a bird. Birds fly. 
 Therefore, Tweety flies. 
 
Johnson shows that, depending on whether one interprets “Birds fly” universally 
(“All birds fly”) or existentially (“Some/most birds fly”), the argument becomes 
either deductively valid (thus not defeasible, according to Pollock) but unsound, 
since “All birds fly” is false, or deductively invalid but defeasible on Pollock’s 
definition. Crucially, Johnson observes, the reason why the argument is unsound on 
the first interpretation is exactly the same that makes it defeasible on the second 
interpretation: that is, the fact that not all birds can fly. This in turn leads Johnson to 
criticize Pollock’s account for not contemplating the possibility of a defeater aimed 
at premises – a shortcoming that Johnson considers an instance of premise 
blindness. 
 Let us start from the first part of Johnson’s argument. Since it is based on the 
analysis of a single example, albeit a very famous one, it is fair to ask whether the 
same considerations would apply equally well to other examples. As a case in point, 
let us consider the following variation of Pollock’s original example: 
 
(2) Tweety is a bird. Most birds fly. 
 Therefore, probably Tweety flies. 
 
This argument is still defeasible, of course: adding the premise “Tweety is a 
penguin” makes the conclusion false, since at that point the fact that Tweety can fly 
is no longer probable. Yet, here the option of considering the argument as 
deductively-valid-but-unsound is not viable: both premises are true, they remain 
true even after adding “Tweety is a penguin”, and the original argument is clearly 
not deductively valid, precisely because its premises could be true, and yet its 
conclusion false. 
 A first upshot of this analysis is that the ambiguity noted by Johnson in 
Pollock's example is not a universal feature of any instance of defeasible reasoning. 
But there is a further insight that can be gained by reflecting on our variation of the 
Tweety case. I take it as self-evident that most people would consider (2) a good 
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argument, and certainly a much better argument than (1). But why is that? After all, 
they are both defeasible, and for the exact same reason: namely, the fact that 
Tweedy may turn out to belong to a non-flying species of birds. 
 The fact that (2) is a better argument than (1) is also revealed by how we 
would judge each of them retrospectively, after having learned that Tweety is in fact 
a penguin. Such revelation would make us realize that (1) was flawed since the 
beginning, either because it was based on a false premise (in the universal 
interpretation) or because the conclusion did not follow from the premises (in the 
existential interpretation). In contrast, learning that Tweety is a penguin would not 
prompt any retrospective criticism of the original argument in (2), since at that 
time, for all we knew, the premises did support the conclusion: that is, knowing that 
Tweety is a bird increased the likelihood of Tweety being able to fly. Nevertheless, 
the additional premise that Tweety is a penguin defeats this argument too, no less 
than what happens in (1). 
 The morale of these considerations is, to me, that genuine defeasibility is 
based on the accrual of evidence – I would even say, it is a side effect of it. The 
universal interpretation of Pollock’s original Tweety example is not an instance of a 
defeasible argument, only of a trivially unsound deductive reasoning. Proper 
defeasibility reflects the fact that conclusions based on evidence are always open to 
revision, if more evidence comes to light. Such revision can be subversive, thus 
defeating the argument, or supportive, providing further grounds for its conclusion: 
as a case in point, imagine being told that “Tweety is not a penguin” as a further 
premise to (2), one that would further strengthen its conclusion. 
 How does all of this connect with Johnson's charge of premise blindness, with 
respect to Pollock's treatment of defeasibility? There are two main points of 
interest. The first is relatively trivial: it amounts to emphasizing that Johnson's 
charge is too narrowly based on a problematic example, so that adequately making 
the point would at least require further discussion of other instances of defeasible 
reasoning. The second aspect is more interesting: focusing on Pollock's original 
Tweety example has the unwanted side effect of limiting the discussion to truth 
considerations, whereas there are other features of premise adequacy that are 
equally relevant, if not more. As I already mentioned, the observation that “Tweety 
is a penguin” is a defeater not only for (1), but also for (2). If we reconstruct it as a 
counter-argument, following Johnson, we end up with: 
 
(3) Tweety is a penguin. [No penguin can fly.] 
 Therefore, it is false that probably Tweety flies. 
 
Interestingly, now (3) defeats (2) not by falsifying its premises (it is still true that 
Tweety is a bird and that most birds can fly, even if Tweety is a penguin), but rather 
by revealing their irrelevance to the point under debate, to wit, whether or not 
Tweety can fly. As far as the ability to fly is in question, knowing that Tweety is a 
bird and that most birds can fly is utterly irrelevant, if Tweety happens to belong to 
the sub-set of non-flying birds. 
 In fact, one may even pursue this line of reasoning a bit further, speculating 
that the intuitive appeal of an argument like (2) is based on pragmatic 
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considerations. In particular, we may give to that argument more credence than its 
literal meaning justifies, precisely because we read an implicature into it: that is, we 
take the speaker to be saying not only that “Tweety is a bird”, but also that, as far as 
s/he knows, “Tweety is not a penguin, nor an ostrich”. Whether or not this is indeed 
part of our standard understanding of that statement is an empirical question, one 
that I do not aim to settle here. But consider the following by way of intuitive 
evidence: If you were presented with argument (2), only to discover later that the 
speaker knew all along that Tweety was a penguin, would you not consider yourself 
justified in remonstrating against the speaker for a breach of basic cooperative 
principles? Personally, I certainly would. 
 To sum up, I tentatively agree with Johnson that Pollock’s treatment of 
defeasibility may be guilty of premise blindness, but I would like to see more 
evidence of that charge before passing a definitive verdict on the matter. As I tried to 
outline here, this would be a useful exercise not only to better establish Johnson’s 
case, but also to enrich his related analysis of premise adequacy. As he knows very 
well, premises are not only adequate in terms of truth, but also depending on their 
relevance, as well as other criteria. Whenever informal logicians fail to pay attention 
to this point, they are in danger of feeding another pathological offspring of 
deductivism: an obsession with truth. 
